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In 1994, Canada, the United States, and Mexico implemented the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), designed to provide a framework for the gov-
ernance of a North American economy. One of the most significant parts of the
agreement was Chapter 17, dealing with intellectual property (IP) and designed to
bring Mexican IP law into line with that of the United States —Canadian IP law
was already substantially similar to that of the U.S. Referring to the copyright sec-
tions of Chapter 17,2 Acheson and Maule (1996) describe the treaty as one step
in the continuing harmonization of North American copyright law, itself embed-
ded in a process of global harmonization spearheaded by the 1995 Agreement on
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) at the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
While NAFTA certainly reoriented Mexican copyright law from a traditional
focus on copyright as a human right protecting authors from such things as false
attribution and ensuring the integrity of works (known as moral rights) toward a
greater (U.S.-like) focus on copyright as an economic right accruing to owners —as
opposed to creators— it has not ushered in a “North American” copyright regime.
Neither has Mexico and Canada’s tighter incorporation into the economic orbit of
the regional and global hegemon led to the wholesale adoption of U.S.-desired copy-
right policies —all the stranger because since the mid-1980s, the United States has
placed IP and copyright policy at the heart of its international economic agenda.3
Instead, somewhat ironically, NAFTA has allowed Canada andMexico (and the U.S.)
some leeway to pursue independent copyright policies, within a global copyright re-
gime shaped largely by the United States. Over 15 years after NAFTA came into effect,
domestic factors continue to be at least as significant as U.S.-based pressures for
harmonization in the making of copyright policy.
Using a historical institutionalist perspective, which emphasizes historical con-
tingency and institutional persistence, this article examines the North American
implementation of two U.S.-backed treaties: the World Intellectual Property Orga-
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nization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty (WCT) and Performances and Phonograms Treaty
(WPPT), jointly known as the WIPO Internet treaties. The aim is to demonstrate the
subtle regional dynamics and dominant domestic politics that have led the three
countries to adopt very different policies based on the same treaty. Referring speci-
fically to the most controversial part of these treaties, the provision of legal pro-
tection for digital locks placed on digital products (such as ebooks, movies, MP3s,
and computer programs), it argues that the three countries’ differential implemen-
tation of the treaties is the result of NAFTA’s guarantee of market access and the
persistence of domestic copyright and parliamentary institutions. NAFTA provides
a kind of “negative governance” that allows domestic political dynamics to deter-
mine largely what acts are made legal or illegal with respect to digital lockbreaking.
As a consequence, domestic institutional, political, economic, and cultural factors
have led to each country defining differently what is considered criminal when it
comes to digital copyright.
This article is divided into four sections. The first provides a brief overview of
historical institutionalism, particularly as a way to think about regional governance,
while the second provides a very brief overview of copyright, the requirements of
the Internet treaties, and the specific way in which the three North American
countries have —or have not— implemented the treaties. The third section ana-
lyzes the implementation process and policy dynamics in the three countries. And
the fourth section then offers some overall comments and conclusions.
Historical Institutionalism
The claims and objectives of historical institutionalism (HI) are modest: “that rela-
tionships between political agency, large-scale societal processes, normative dem-
ocratic prescriptions, existing institutional arrangements, and institutional develop-
ment are complex and that knowledge about the functioning of formally organized
institutions adds to our understanding of continuity and change in democratic con-
texts” (Olsen, 2009: 26). In HI, institutions are seen as semi-persistent “constraints or
rules that induce stability in human interaction” (Voss, 2001: 7561) and structure indi-
viduals and groups’ interactions with each other and with broader social forces. Actors
pursue strategic self-interests, partly shaped by the institutional “rules of the game,”
and encounter institutions both as constraints on action and as rules that can be mod-
ified by the actors themselves.4 Change in HI is not driven wholly from on high (struc-
turalism) or below (individualism/atomism), but emerges through the interaction of
both within an institutional structure whose rules and procedures shape it.
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4 One way to think of this is by introducing time into one’s analysis, as in Archer’s “morphogenic” ana-
lytic approach (1995). In the initial time period, actors confront institutions as pre-existing rules. In
the second period, however, they can work to modify these rules, so that the rules have been changed
in the third period. The choice of time periods is made for analytical purposes; in reality, actors con-
tinually make and remake institutions.
Key to HI is the concept of “path dependence,” which refers to the claim that
the initial establishment of an institution is highly sensitive to historical contingency,
in which small, early events can have large future consequences (Katznelson, 2003:
291; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 599). Once established, institutions structure fu-
ture actions, resulting not so much in institutional stasis, but, rather, “constrained
innovation” (Campbell, 2004: 8) and institutional persistence: “preceding steps in
a particular direction induce further movement in the same direction” (Pierson,
2000: 251-252). Understanding what leads to path dependence or divergence from
a path requires paying attention to “who is invested in what particular arrange-
ments, how is it sustained over time, how other groups not invested in the insti-
tution are kept out,” and what might impair this form of reproduction and lead to
change (Thelen, 1999: 391).
An HI approach therefore starts with the relevant institutions and asks how they
structure and constitute actors. It also requires identifying the underlying proce-
sses that support these institutions, including the various paradigms and public
sentiments that support or undermine them, and the frames and programs that
are deployed by interested actors in order to promote their perspective. Attention
must be paid to the —potentially conflicting— logics of competing and comple-
mentary institutions, as well as to changes in these institutional supports over time,
either as the result of exogenous or endogenous shocks. HI also requires the iden-
tification of the relevant actors, their interests, resources and strategies employed.
A mid-range theory (or method [Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998: 50]) potentially
compatible with general or structural theories of politics (Pollack, 2004: 154; Mahoney
and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 7) that emphasizes how historical contingency can lead
to different outcomes in structurally similar cases, it is particularly well suited to
understanding regional development, in which regional institutions are often
imposed on pre-existing institutional set-ups that can affect its future course. In
the case of regional analysis, criticisms of HI —that it potentially overstates the
uniqueness of a specific case (Immergut, 1998: 27), is “biased in favor of cross-
national variation” (Pontusson, 1995: 129), or does better explaining stability rather
than change (see, e.g., Peters, Pierre, and King, 2005)— are strengths, not weaknesses.
While they may be considered problems for those seeking generalizable regionalism
theories (for a summary, see Hurrell, 1995), they may also be seen as presenting a high
hurdle for claims regarding the emergence of regional governance.
North American Regional Institutions and Actors
Institutionally, NAFTA has played two roles. First, it has a profound effect on Mex-
ican copyright law.5 Previously, Mexican copyright (or derechos de autor, literally
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5 NAFTA’s copyright sections were designed primarily to bring Mexican copyright policy into line with
that of the United States; Canadian copyright law, already substantially similar to U.S. copyright pol-
icy, was not affected by NAFTA.
“authors’ rights”) law and the domestic institutions supporting it had been mainly con-
cerned with protecting authors’ moral rights in their works. As part of the overall
NAFTA deal, itself rooted in the neoliberal model that replaced Mexico’s discredit-
ed import-substitution-industrialization model (Golob, 2003), Mexico agreed to U.S.
demands that it restructure its copyright regime to emphasize copyright as an eco-
nomic right available to publishers, distributors, and other middlemen, including
foreign companies, rather than just authors. It therefore expanded the number, type,
and focus of Mexican groups with a stake in the copyright debate.
Second, NAFTA has, somewhat ironically, constrained the ability of the United
States to influence its neighbors’ economic and copyright policy. Since the mid-
1980s, the United States has used trade agreements as its main tool to convince
other countries to change their IP and copyright laws, effectively trading market
access for legal changes. This was how the United States managed to change the
path of Mexican copyright law.
This change is not insignificant: altering the focus of Mexican copyright (dis-
cussed below) influences the outcome of future policy debates. This change, how-
ever, came at the price of a reduced U.S. ability to directly influence Mexican —and
Canadian— copyright policy: with NAFTA and secure market access in place, the
United States could no longer use the carrot of increased market access or the stick
of reduced access to convince Mexico or Canada to change its laws. Instead, the
U.S. government (a regional actor in this sense) has had to resort to deploying di-
plomatic pressure via its embassies, its content industries (such as Hollywood and
the music industry, themselves global players with interests in Canada and Mexico),
and through the Special 301 process, an annual (though largely toothless) review
of other countries’ IP policies.
With respect to actors, the U.S. government and the content industries (mainly
U.S.-based) can be thought of regional actors, though in reality it is more accurate
to say that they are deploying a global strategy within NorthAmerica (Clarkson, 2008).
There is little or no evidence of regional civil society groups and little cross-border
cooperation beyond information sharing. Indeed, Mexico’s nascent copyright civil
society groups have stronger links to Spain and the rest of Latin and South Amer-
ica than they do to groups in the U.S. or Canada.
In the presence of few regional actors and limited regional institutions, domes-
tic institutions could be expected to dominate the copyright debate in the three
countries. This is, indeed, the case.
The 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties
And Technological Protection Measures
On December 20, 1996, Canada, Mexico, and the United States joined over 60
other countries in adopting the Internet treaties. The treaties were a U.S.-driven
response (Samuelson, 1997) to the challenges posed to copyright policy in a digital
age: how to enforce copyright law given technology (personal computers and the In-
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ternet) that allowed individuals to easily and inexpensively reproduce and distribute
anything that could be converted into zeroes and ones.
One of the responses, covered in the treaty, involved extending legal protections
to digital locks, known as technological protection measures (TPMs). TPMs control
the access and use of the work that it has locked down. For example, someone can
place a TPM on a PDF file that requires the user to input a password before the work
can be copied or altered. Or a TPM on a song or a movie can limit the number of
times it is played, on what machines it can be played, or how many times it can be
copied, if at all.
As these examples show, while TPMs can limit copymaking (which copyright
also does), their uses can also extend to attempts at market control (e.g., making
some works useable only on some machines) and interfering with existing user
rights under copyright (among other issues see, for example, de Beer, 2005 and
2009; Samuelson, 2003; Kerr, Maurushat, and Tacit, 2002-2003; Litman, 2006;
and Gillespie, 2007). For example, every copyright law allows copying for acade-
mic purposes. However, a password-protected PDF that prevents an academic from
copying a paragraph from that document is a (small) restriction on her legal rights.
These digital locks can have similar effects when placed on works already in the
public domain.6
From the copyright owner’s perspective, TPMs have a significant drawback: they
can be broken, often quite easily. As a result, they are unable to fully lock down di-
gital content. In response, copyright owners have sought to make it illegal to break
TPMs. Such legal protection presents a difficult policy issue: how to ensure that
such protection does not interfere with users’ right to break locks when the locks
have nothing to do with copyright or to exercise their rights under copyright law.
During the Internet treaties negotiations, the United States, backed by its con-
tent industries, pushed for a ban on the sale of all devices that could circumvent
digital locks, a “maximalist” position that would have provided strong protection
to copyright owners’ works, but with the major negative effect of making it impos-
sible for non-hackers to access the tools needed to exercise their legal and legiti-
mate rights (Samuelson, 1997). This position has the potential to render impotent
the user-creator-owner balances that have been negotiated into copyright law over
centuries. TPMs protected too strongly allow those who control the locks to set the
conditions of use, potentially far beyond those allowed by copyright law. At its worst,
legal protection of TPMs has the potential to effectively privatize copyright law in
the hands of those who control the digital locks.
However, as the result of objections by developing countries and U.S. con-
sumer-electronics industries (who make their living by providing access to copy-
righted works), the final wording required only that signatories
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6 Copyright is a right limited in time: after a certain period (generally speaking, the life of the author
plus 50 years in Canada; life plus 70 years in the United States; and life plus 100 years in Mexico),
a work is said to enter into the “public domain” and be freely copiable by anyone without permission
or payment.
provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumven-
tion of effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with
the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict
acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or
permitted by law. (WCTArticle 11; WPPT Article 18 uses the same language with respect
to performers and phonogram producers.)
A “minimalist” interpretation of these provisions would make it a crime to break
a digital lock only if it is done for the purpose, or with the effect of, violating an
underlying copyright. While there is some controversy over this language, particu-
larly the meaning of “adequate” and “effective” (see, e.g., Ricketson and Ginsburg.
2006; Tawfik, 2005: 80), the treaties provide countries with significant leeway in
interpreting how strong protection should be, and seem to limit it only to copyright,
and not meaning it to be an expansive right.7
Country Choices
The United States
The three NorthAmerican countries have implemented the treaties in different ways.
In 1998, the United States passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),
a “maximalist” interpretation of the treaties. DMCA Section 1201, subject to certain
limitations, protects a TPM that restricts access and use in the service of a copyright
owner’s rights. What makes the DMCA a maximalist interpretation of the WIPO Inter-
net treaties is that it forbids people to “manufacture, import, offer to the public, pro-
vide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or
part thereof,” that would allow individuals to circumvent TPMs designed to control
access or limit copying of a work, if the following criteria are met:
• The device is primarily designed for this purpose,
• It has only limited commercially significance other than to circumvent TPMs, or
• It is marketed as such a circumvention device (DMCA 1201[a][2] and 1201
[a][3][B]).
Despite the language in section 1201 (b)(2)(B), this blanket ban would also
have the effect of reducing access to circumvention devices for non-infringing pur-
poses having nothing to do with copyright or for fair-use purposes. Furthermore, these
criteria are “rather vague and ambiguous,” and “could create significant uncertainty
for manufacturers and distributors of consumer electronics, telecommunications, com-
puting equipment, and commercial software” (Kerr, Maurushat, and Tacit, 2002-
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2003: 66). Since then, the U.S. government and its industries have aggressively
sought the implementation of DMCA-type rules by other countries, including Canada
and Mexico.
Canada
In Canada and Mexico, the situation is more complicated. Canada, following pu-
blic hearings and studies in 2001-2002, attempted to implement the treaties twice.
In 2005, a minority Liberal government proposed a “minimalist” law, Bill C-60,
which would have made it illegal to break a TPM only for the purposes of infring-
ing the underlying copyright; trade in circumvention devices was ignored (Banks
and Kitching, 2005). The bill died on the Order Paper when the January 2006
election was called. In 2007/2008, the Conservative government proposed a bill
(C-61) that would have largely copied the TPM provisions of the U.S. DMCA. How-
ever, its introduction to Parliament was delayed for six months by an unexpected
public-grassroots outcry during a particularly sensitive period in which the minor-
ity Conservative government could not be sure that it could control the House of
Commons (Haggart, n.d.); the delay was enough to make it fall victim, like the
Liberal’s bill, to an election call in September 2008. In 2009, the government held
hearings into copyright reform and reaffirmed its commitment to copyright reform
in the March 3, 2010, Speech from the Throne, but as of late March 2010, no
bill has yet been introduced.
Mexico
As part of a comprehensive reform of its copyright law instigated by its NAFTA obli-
gations, Mexico provided limited legal protection for TPMs in 1997, but only for
those protecting computer software. In language similar to that which would be
drafted into the 1998 U.S. DMCA, Article 112 of the Federal Copyright Law (LFDA)
prohibits “the importation, manufacture, distribution, and use of equipment or
services intended to eliminate the technical protection of computer programs, of
transmissions across the spectrum of electromagnetic and telecommunications net-
works and programs’ electronic elements,” while Article 231(V) imposes criminal
sanctions on the importation, sale, or lease of any program or the performance of
any act that would have as its purpose the deactivation of the protective electronic
controls of computer software. Violation of these articles is punishable by impris-
onment of three to ten years and a fine of 2 000 to 20 000 times the daily minimum
wage. Furthermore, while the LFDA does not define circumvention, a non-paper
presented at WIPO by the National Copyright Institute (Indautor), Mexico’s copy-
right authority, suggests that it is only an issue when the underlying copyright or
author’s rights have been infringed (Indautor, 2008). A 2003 copyright reform bill was
silent on TPMs and WIPO treaty implementation generally.
Explaining Implementation
The United States
U.S. copyright policymaking is a pragmatist’s game, involving tradeoffs among var-
ious interest groups that have a seat at the table. As Litman documents extensively
(2006), since the early 1900s, copyright law reform has involved inter-industry ne-
gotiations overseen by a state that acts as arbiter, ratifying the consensus reached
by the players. As a result, copyright law reflects the interests and relative economic
and political strength of those who have been invited to the table, although legis-
lation is crafted in such a way as to offer narrow exceptions to win the support of the
various groups involved. Generally speaking, this process is friendly to the status quo:
already-established groups have the advantage over upstarts, specific interests (i.e.,
industries) generally outclass the overall “public interest,” and every invited guest
does better than the wallflowers.
In U.S. copyright policy, the content industries, particularly the motion pic-
ture and music industries, deploy the most politically influential lobbyists, a fact
reflected in the general bias of the U.S. copyright industry and in the DMCA itself.
As two economists critical of copyright argue, Congress has been “bought and paid
for” by a content industry (Boldrin and Levine, 2008: 251) that has, for example,
in a separate 1998 bill, received retroactive term-of-protection extensions. The U.S.
Constitution requires that copyright (and IP generally) “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” A retroactive exten-
sion of rights to cover already-created works cannot possibly induce future inno-
vation, meaning that this bill, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
cannot be characterized as anything but pure rent-seeking by the content industries,
who own the vast majority of copyrights.
The DMCA conformed generally to this picture of inter-industry bargaining over-
seen by a generally copyright-friendly Congress. In Litman’s definitive account of
the political process that led to the DMCA , she describes what ended up being a
“hodgepodge,” reflecting competing views expressed by the various Congressional
committees (that often held divergent views on what the law should do) and the
stakeholders these committees represented.
Generally speaking, however, the TPM provisions were of the maximalist kind
desired by the content industries. Groups critical of legal protection of TPMs (research
libraries, the consumer-electronics industry, and a group of academics and lawyers
concerned with “fair use” issues)8 each received limited exceptions, including a
“Rule-making process” that would require the Librarian of Congress to review the
legislation every three years to determine whether further exemptions should be
added to this list. (The DMCA overall represented a compromise between the con-
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tent industries, which wanted legal protection for TPMs and the powerful telecom-
munications lobby, which in turn wanted (and received) protection from liability
for the infringing acts of its customers [Litman, 2006].) However, the blanket ban
on the manufacture and traffic in circumvention devices has been criticized for
effectively making it impossible for those lacking the technological savvy to build
programs to break digital locks —i.e., most people— to exercise their rights under
the Copyright Act (see, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation [EFF] [2010] for an
overview of the effects of this section of the DMCA).
In the end, the TPM language of the DMCA was determined almost exclusively
by domestic U.S. politics. The open language of the Internet treaties, while much
more permissive than that originally sought by the United States —that language
was eventually incorporated into the DMCA — both avoided constraining the U.S.
policymaking process in any way and allowed the United States to continue, in good
faith, to promote its maximalist approach to copyright (i.e., the DMCA) to other
countries as the legitimate way that the Internet treaties should be implemented.
Canada
Of the three countries, Canadian copyright policies are the most complex, involv-
ing a somewhat unique bureaucratic setup, a weak “domestic” lobby for copyright
reform, anti-American sentiments and, since the early 2000s and especially since
December 1997, the politicization of what has traditionally been seen as a techni-
cal, commercial law. Taken together, these factors explain both the continued non-
implementation of the treaties and why both maximalist and minimalist copyright
bills have been introduced (but not passed).
Canada’s domestic copyright-policymaking institutions are biased toward
compromise.9 Unusually, copyright is the joint responsibility of two departments,
the Department of Industry and the Department of Canadian Heritage, each with
conflicting —and sometimes diametrically opposed— mandates. Generally speaking,
performers, writers, and other creators, and, most importantly, industry groups like
the Canadian Recording Industry Association (CRIA), see Heritage Canada as their
voice (Doern and Sharaput, 2000: 24); and Industry Canada represents the tech-
nology industries, which traditionally represent consumers, business, and investors,
from the point of view of wishing to increase Canadian productivity and innovation.
The vigor with which each bureaucracy defends its mandate often interferes with the
timely pursuit of reform, even when their respective ministers are ostensibly in
agreement about what should be done (Haggart, n.d.).
This tendency to balance largely explains the 2005 bill. As Doyle documents
thoroughly (2006), the bill was the result of strenuous lobbying by CRIA of the De-
partment of Canadian Heritage and its then-minister, Sheila Copps. However,
9 This chapter’s focus on framework policy of necessity puts to one side the other ministries and quasi-
governmental agencies that also affect actual policy.
despite Copps’s clout in the Liberal party as a senior minister, the strength of the
eventual bill’s TPM regulations were mitigated by users and other interest groups,
traditionally represented by the Department of Industry.
The 2007/2008 bill and its delay demonstrate the complex role of the United
States and civil society in the Canadian copyright debate, especially in the context
of a minority Parliament. The decision to pursue DMCA-style TPM rules was purely
political, the result of pressure from a Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) intent on
passing a U.S.-friendly law. As Michele Austin, then-Industry Minister Maxime
Bernier’s (2006-2007) chief of staff, recounts, “The Prime Minister’s Office’s po-
sition was, move quickly, satisfy the United States.” When the two ministers res-
ponsible protested for political and technical reasons, the PMO replied “‘We don’t
care what you do, as long as the U.S. is satisfied’” (Haggart, n.d.).
U.S. pressure on Canada to implement the WIPO Internet treaties predates the
Conservative government. For several years, Canada has faced “considerable” U.S.
pressure to ratify the treaties quickly with legislation modeled on the U.S. DMCA
(Tawfik, 2005: 79). It has been mentioned by successive U.S. Ambassadors to Ca-
nada, and Canada continues to be mentioned on the U.S. Special 301 Watch List
(and the higher-level “Priority Watch List” in 2009) of countries with IP laws it
deems inadequate. That said, possible reasons for the PMO’s position include a desire
to demonstrate that the new Conservative government was more U.S.-friendly than
its Liberal predecessor and, more proximately, U.S. insistence in August 2007,
within the context of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America
(SPP), that it would not discuss border-related impediments to Canadian access to
the U.S. market if Canada did not move on the copyright file (Geist, 2008). The re-
sulting bill’s inclusion suggests the importance of linkages to U.S. success in getting
other countries to undertake U.S.-friendly copyright reform, as well as the central
role the Prime Minister’s Office plays in making policy generally.
The resulting bill largely reflected the DMCA position on TPMs. However, the
ensuing controversy emphasized how the issue had been politicized. First, in 2006,
a group of musicians representing a Who’s Who of Canadian musicians, includ-
ing Steven Page, formerly of the Barenaked Ladies, Avril Lavigne, and Sarah
McLachlan, formed the CanadianMusic Creators’Coalition (www.musiccreators.ca)
to argue for a “balanced” copyright system that does not punish their fans. This
placed them in conflict with the CRIA, which, although it represents the recording
industry and not recording artists, had traditionally legitimized its calls for stronger
copyright protection by claiming it would benefit artists. The emergence of the
CMCC made it difficult for CRIA to argue for stronger copyright based on appeals
to cultural nationalism; similarly, the 2006 split of independent Canadian record
companies from CRIA (CBC, 2006) further complicated its claims that stronger copy-
right laws are in Canada’s (as opposed to some foreign companies’) interest.
Grassroots opposition to the bill, instigated by a Facebook group, Fair Copyright
for Canada, started by University of Ottawa law professor Michael Geist, picked
up on these themes. Appealing both to policy arguments and emotion, opponents
denounced the “born in the U.S.A.” copyright bill (thus appealing to a current of
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anti-Americanism) and calling for public hearings to determine what a balanced
“made in Canada” bill should look like. In the end, this opposition was sufficient
to delay the bill’s introduction from December 2007 to June 2008, though its ulti-
mate fate was decided when the government fell in September 2008.
The public opposition, however, has had a lasting effect. Within Parliament,
the leftist New Democratic Party has actively embraced calls for balanced copyright
laws where before, like all parties, it had seen copyright only in terms of granting
stronger rights for artists. (The centrist Liberal party’s position is currently unclear,
while the separatist Bloc Québécois is in favor of stronger copyright protection,
seeing it, as does Mexico, as a way to protect Quebec culture.) Furthermore, in the
summer of 2009, the Conservative government reversed its opposition to public
consultations and held a series of them on copyright reform across the country,
including implementation of the Internet treaties.
The success of public opposition in delaying the bill is likely due to the fact that
in December 2007 it was unclear how strong the opposition parties, particularly the
Liberals, were. Facing a particularly contentious vote on whether to continue Ca-
nada’s military involvement in theAfghan war in the winter 2008 session, the Conser-
vative government, when confronted with unexpected public opposition, decided
that discretion was the better part of valor and delayed the introduction of the bill.
Whether such opposition would be successful going forward is unclear. However,
the significant lesson from the ongoing Canadian case is that the diametrically
opposed Liberal and Conservative bills demonstrate that U.S.-style protection of
TPMs in Canada is not a foregone conclusion: if the possibility that Canada will
implement DMCA-style TPM provisions has not disappeared, it has certainly been
reduced (Haggart, n.d.).
Mexico
The explanation for why Mexico has yet to extend TPM protection in any form to
non-software digital works is quite straightforward, involving a relative lack of
interest in the issue from the main groups involved in making Mexican copyright
policy. Until 2009, creators, represented in Mexico by collective management asso-
ciations (discussed below), the copyright industries, the U.S. government, whose
interests are aligned with the U.S.-based copyright industries, and Mexican copy-
right authorities have been much more concerned with traditional large-scale, com-
mercial unauthorized copying of physical CDs, DVDs and books, which remains
endemic in Mexico. Broadband Internet penetration rates in Mexico remain low
compared to its northern neighbors, meaning that the scale of unauthorized online
digital copying has been treated as a secondary issue.
With respect to those parts of the treaties that have been implemented, most
importantly TPM protection with respect to computer software, U.S. pressure related
to the negotiation and implementation of NAFTA and the fact that, for the U.S.,
software protection was seen as a pressing issue (Schmidt, 2009). This finding is
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in keeping with traditional U.S. policy to link market access with IP reform. That
the treaties were not implemented in 2003 and have yet to be implemented despite
continuous demands from the U.S. government and industries (United States
Trade Representative, 1989-2009; International Intellectual Property Alliance,
2005-2010) indicates both the extent to which U.S.-based industries and the U.S.
government saw them as secondary, as well as the fact that the United States is
unable to dictate the pace of reforms without a compelling carrot and stick.
There are indications that within the next five years (i.e., by 2015), as Mexican
broadband penetration increases, Mexico will implement the treaties, and while
these things are never certain, the institutional, political, and socioeconomic fac-
tors influencing the development of Mexican copyright, make conditions favor-
able for the adoption of U.S.-style rules regarding TPMs. Current official Mexican
views on copyright incorporate the traditional view that it is an author’s right that
should be maximized, downplaying users’ rights. For example, Indautor sees its
role primarily as protecting and maximizing authors’ and owners’ rights. Since a new
head of Indautor was hired in 2007, it has indicated a desire to implement the
treaties; furthermore, its wave of hirings from the copyright industries suggests a
certain comfort level with U.S. views on TPMs (Haggart, n.d.).
Furthermore, with the blessing of Indautor and the Mexican Institute for In-
dustrial Property (IMPI), which enforces the commercial aspects of Mexico’s copy-
right law, the main stakeholders in Mexican copyright policymaking, the collective
management associations and the copyright industries have formed a Coalition
for Legal Access to Culture (Notimex, 2009), with the goal of reaching common
positions on issues of mutual concern. This alliance is significant given that histor-
ically Mexican copyright law has been treated, as in the United States, as a techni-
cal, apolitical matter best left to negotiations among the various parties, overseen
by the government. Such a coalition would be unlikely in Canada, where copy-
right policy is viewed primarily not as a domestic-policy concern, but of greatest
interest and value to foreign (i.e., U.S.) companies. While the groups involved in
the Mexican coalition see TPM implementation as a secondary issue —more im-
portant for them is implementing rules governing the liability of Internet service
providers for copyright violations carried out by their customers— the fact that
these groups have called for the Internet treaties’ full implementation, combined
with their pursuit of “maximalist” copyright policies, further suggests sympathy with
U.S.-style TPM rules.
With no other major groups opposed to strong TPM protection in Mexico, po-
tential public interest is a wild card. Presently, copyright is not a pressing public
issue, since inexpensive bootlegged works are freely available everywhere, and only
about 9.8 percent of Mexican households had broadband Internet access in 2008
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Broadband Portal, 2009).
However, if awareness grows, digital copyright in general could easily become
politicized, as it has in Canada. Already, some Mexican academics are trying to
draw attention to the perils of maximalist copyright for access to information and
culture. For example, the first Mexican academic book dealing with these issues
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was published in June 2009 (López Cuenca and Ramírez Pedrajo, 2009: 346);
and in March 2010, the Spanish Cultural Center hosted a three-day workshop,
“Communities, Free Culture, and Intellectual Property,” as part of the 2010 Mex-
ico Festival, an annual arts and culture festival held in Mexico City.
Politicians also seem to be paying greater attention to copyright as an innova-
tion and economic —rather than purely cultural— issue. In October 2008, the pre-
sident of the Senate Science and Technology Commission, Francisco Castellón
Fonseca, from the left-leaning PRD, argued to consider regulating copyright for its
cultural and economic effects, since it has the potential to generate as much or more
revenues than industrial property (i.e., patents) (Comisión de Ciencia y Tecnología
del Senado de México, 2008). In March 2010, he criticized negotiations over the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which at the time of writing of this
chapter was being negotiated in secret among a host of developing countries, for
its potential effects on individual freedoms (Castellón Fonseca, 2010).
However, whether copyright will become sufficiently politicized to affect tra-
ditional inter-industry negotiations remains unclear.
Analysis and Conclusion
An examination of these three mini-case studies through the lens of historical ins-
titutionalism demonstrates the extent to which the Canadian, U.S., and Mexican
decisions to implement —or not— the Internet treaties, and the manner of imple-
mentation, have been shaped primarily by domestic, not regional, politics. They
reveal no evidence of any strong regional institutional or regional-actor influences.
To the extent that any clearly NorthAmerican dynamic is at work, it involves a) NAFTA
as a restraint on the U.S. ability to refuse its neighbors access to its markets if its
policy proposals are not adopted; b) the U.S. and its industries as significant actors
in the making of Canadian and Mexican public policy; and c) the degree to which
NAFTA reshaped the Mexican copyright landscape, giving voice to actors who other-
wise would not have been as important, and potentially affecting the course of fu-
ture legislative reform.All of these dynamics, however, would probably be observed
in U.S. relations with any country with which it has a trade agreement since the
United States is at the center of what is a global, not regional, copyright regime. In
short, NAFTA has not led to the regionalization of North American copyright regimes,
which continue to be shaped significantly by domestic politics.
Domestically, each country is characterized by a unique constellation of inter-
est groups, as well as the institutional frameworks in which they operate, leading
unsurprisingly to situations in which what is considered legal in one country is
illegal in another. One interesting point that emerges from this analysis is the extent
to which the copyright debate in the United States is relatively self-contained,
while those in Mexico and Canada are affected by U.S.-based actors promoting
U.S.-derived solutions. Not only are the two countries responding to initiatives from
a U.S.-influenced treaty, but actors in both countries also couch their arguments
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for and against TPM protection in terms of the U.S. DMCA. This state of affairs
reinforces the extent to which copyright policy in Mexico and Canada is driven,
though not dictated by, the United States.
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